IMF-美国真的摆脱了二战债务吗？（英）-2024.1.docx

INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDDidtheU.S.ReallyGrowOutofItsWorldWarIlDebt?JulienAcalinand1.aurenceBallWP/24/5IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(三)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(三)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.WoRK-NGPAPER2024JANWP/24/5©2024InternationalMonetaryFundIMFWorkingPaperResearchDepartmentDidtheU.S.ReallyGrowOutofItsWorldWarIlDebt?PreparedbyJulienAcalinand1.aurenceBall*AuthorizedfordistributionbyPrachiMishraJanuary2024IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(三)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheathor(三)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:ThefallintheU.S.publicdebt/GDPratiofrom106%in1946to23%in1974isoftenattributedtohighratesofeconomicgrowth.Thispaperexaminestherolesofthreeotherfactors:primarybudgetsurpluses,surpriseinflation,andpeggedinterestratesbeforetheFed-TreasuryAccordof1951.Ourcentralresultisasimulationofthepaththatthedebt/GDPratiowouldhavefollowedwithprimarybudgetbalanceandwithoutthedistortionsinrealinterestratescausedbysurpriseinflationandthepre-Accordpeg.Inthiscounterfactal,debt/GDPdeclinesonlyto74%in1974,not23%asinactualhistory.Moreover,theratiostartsrisingagainin1980andin2022itis84%.Thesefindingsimplythat,overthelast76years,onlyasmallamountofdebtreductionhasbeenachievedthroughgrowthratesthatexceedundistortedinterestrates.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Acalin,Julienand1.aurenceBall(2024):'DidtheU.S.ReallyGrowOutofitsWorldWarIlDebt?',IMFWorkingPaper.JE1.ClassificationNumbers:E31,E43,E65,H60,H63Keywords:U.S.PublicDebt;FinancialRepression;SurpriseInflation;r-gAuthor,sE-MailAddress:iacalinimf.orq:lballihu.eduWearegratefultoGeorgeHallforhelpwiththedata.WethankFrancesBianchi,RuiEsteves,OlivierJeanne,N.GregoryMankiw,RicardoReis,andparticipantsintheJHUMacro-Financeseminar,theCEPRInternationalMacro-Historyonlineseminar,andtheDebtCon6Princetonconferenceforusefulcomments.WealsothankKyungWoongKohforoutstandingresearchassistance.ContentsIntroduction1FactorsInfluencingtheDebt/GDPRatio3ConstructingCounterfactualPathsoftheDebt/GDPRatio6DataandMeasurement13Results19ComparisontoHallandSargent(2011)22Conclusions25References28Tables29Figures30Appendix341 IntroductionDoesahighlevelofnationaldebtimposeaburdenonfuturegenerationswhomustpayitoff?Inrecentyears,economistssuchasBlanchard(2019)andFurmanandSummers(2020)havesuggestedthattheanswermaybeno,becauser<g:therealinterestrateondebtisusuallybelowthegrowthrateoftheeconomy.Underthatcondition,thegovernmentcanrolloverthedebtandaccumulatinginterestwithoutraisingtaxes,andthedebt/GDPratiowillfallovertime.Becauseofthispossibility,agrowingnumberofeconomistsagreeWithBlanchardthatupublicdebtmayhavenofiscalcost.”ThisideahasdecreasedconcernaboutthehighcurrentlevelofU.S.debt.Thinkingonthisissuehasbeeninfluencedbyasalienthistoricalexperience:thedeclineintheU.S.debt/GDPratioafterWorldWarI1.Payingforthewarincreasedthisratiofrom42%infiscalyear1941to106%in1946,butthenitstartedtofallandreachedatroughof23%infiscalyear1974.AsElmendorfandMankiw(1999)report,wanimportantfactorbehindthedramaticdropbetween1945and1975isthatthegrowthrateofGDPexceededtheinterestrateongovernmentdebtformostofthatperiod/5Krugman(2012)saysthatthe“debtfromWorldWarIIwasneverrepaidandjustbecameincreasinglyirrelevantastheU.S.economygrew.”Thisinterpretationofhistorylendscredencetotheideathatahighlevelofdebtshouldnotcausegreatconcern.However,otherresearchershavesuggestedreasonstoquestionthisinterpretation.First,asdiscussedbyauthorssuchasHallandSargent(2011)andEichengreenandEsteves(2022),theU.S.actuallypaidoffpartoftheWorldWarIIdebtbyrunningprimarysurplusesbylevyingtaxesinexcessofcurrentgovernmentspendingovermuchoftheperiodwhenthedebt/GDPratiowasfalling.Second,asdiscussedbyauthorssuchasReinhartandSbrancia(2015),interestrateswerehelddownrelativetoeconomicgrowththroughpoliciesthatarenotlikelytobefeasibleand/ordesirableinthefuture.Thesepoliciesincludedepisodesoffinancialrepression,mostclearlytheFedpeggingofinterestratesatlowlevelsfrom1942to1951,whichwasaimedatdecreasingthecostofthewar.Inaddition,ex-postrealinterestrateswerereducedbyunexpectedrisesininflationintheaftermathofthewarandlaterinthe1960sand1970s.Becauseofthesefactors,thepostwarexperiencedoesnotnecessarilysuggestthattheU.S.economynaturallygrowsoutofdebt.Thispaperseekstoexplainthepathofthedebt/GDPratiosinceits1946peakof106%.Weestimatetheeffectsonthispathofthegovernment'sprimarysurpluses,theinterestratepegbefore1951,andsurpriseinflation.WethenderiveaCounterfactualpaththatthedebt/GDPratiowouldhavefollowedintheabsenceofthesefactors.ThisCounterfactualshowshowmuchtheratiowasreducedbygrowthratesinexcessofundistortedrealinterestratesratesthatarenotreducedbyeitherapegorsurpriseinflation.WefindthatthisCounterf